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Comments

Facially Discriminatory Admissions Policies
in Homeless Shelters and the Fair
Housing Act
Greg C. Cheynet

I. INTRODUCTION

During recent decades, legislators have created strong protections for individuals from housing discrimination in its various forms. Thanks to these efforts, sex and familial status have
joined race, color, religion, national origin, and disability as protected classes,' and administrative agencies have been charged
with proactively enforcing all fair housing laws. 2 Courts have
similarly risen to the task of protecting against discrimination
based on sex and familial status, finding violations in ever-3
widening categories of structures including mobile home parks
4
and temporary farm-labor camps.
t BA 2007, University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2010, University of Chicago.
1 Fair Housing Act, 42 USC § 3604 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sex and familial status in addition to race, color, religion, national origin, and disability).
States have also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex and familial status. See, for
example, Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act, RI Gen Laws § 34-37-4 (2009) (banning discrimination on the basis of sex); Alaska Stat § 18.80.200 (2009) (banning discrimination on the basis of parenthood, marital status, change in marital status, and pregnancy); Arizona Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 33-1317(A)
(2008) (banning discrimination based on the presence of children).
2 Executive Order Number 12,892, 59 Fed Reg 2939 (1994) (instructing agency
heads to enforce fair housing laws under the coordination of the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
3 United States v Lepore, 816 F Supp 1011, 1021 (M D Pa 1991) (holding that a mo-
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Despite these efforts, the occupants of one class of structure
remain subject to frequent discrimination. Every day, homeless
shelters openly discriminate against potential occupants. Restrictive admissions policies instruct shelter staff to turn indi5
viduals away on the basis of their sex or familial status. Most
emergency and temporary homeless shelters in the United States,
are segregated based on sex. 6 Because these policies treat occupants differently based on their membership to a protected class,
they meet the definition of facial discrimination and are recog7
nized as such by courts.
While the impacts of this discrimination have not been well
studied, there is evidence of serious adverse effects on the low8
income population. Fathers are forced to leave their families.
Children are placed in foster care.9 The composition of the lowincome population is altered ° and likely for the worse.1 1 Adolescent sons are separated from their families and left to fend for
bile home park owner's policy of limiting occupancy of trailers to two people violated the
Fair Housing Act's prohibition against discrimination based on familial status).
4 Hernandez v Ever Fresh Co, 923 F Supp 1305, 1309 (D Or 1996) (holding that the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of familial status in the Fair Housing Act
applies to labor camps for migrant workers).
5 Linda Weinreb and Peter H. Rossi, The American Homeless Family Shelter 'System" 69 Soc Serv Rev 86, 95-97 (1995) (documenting how restrictive admissions policies
function).
6 Lisa Mottet and John M. Ohle, Transitioning Our Shelters: A Guide for Making
Homeless Shelters Safe for TransgenderPeople, 1 (The National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute 2003), available at
<http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransitioningOurShelters.pdf>
(lasted visited Apr 29, 2009) (noting that most emergency and temporary homeless shelters in the United States are segregated based on sex).
7 International Union v Johnson Controls, 499 US 187, 197-99 (1991) (finding a sexspecific fetal protection policy "facially discriminatory because it requires only a female
employee to produce proof that she is not capable of reproducing .... [E]xplicit facial
discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the
explicit terms of the discrimination."); Community House, Inc v City of Boise, 490 F3d
1041, 1048 (9th Cir 2007) (finding a shelter policy that excluded women and families to be
"facially discriminatory because it explicitly treats women and families different from
men").
8 Weinreb and Rossi, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 95 (cited in note 5) (noting that family shelters that do not admit men force men to abandon their families for shelter).
9 Francine Jacobs, Priscilla Little, and Cheryl Almeida, Supporting Family Life: A
Survey of Homeless Shelters, 2 J Soc Distress & Homeless 269, 283 (1993) (documenting
policies which encourage parents to put their children in foster care to receive help).
10 Peter H. Rossi, Troubling Families:Family Homelessness in America, 37 Am Beh
Sci 342, 379 (1994) (arguing that the population of homeless families is skewed toward
young single mothers with small families because of admissions policies restricting men
and large families).
I Kay Y. McChesney, A Review of the Empirical Literature on Contemporary Urban
Homeless Families, 69 Soc Serv Rev 429, 447 (1995) (arguing that restrictive admissions
policies may diminish social support for homeless individuals).
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themselves, 12 and men, women, and children are exposed to the
humiliation of discriminatory treatment.
More and more Americans are joining the population vulnerable to these policies. Homelessness has become a major problem nationwide, even for working families. 13 In every county,
more than the minimum wage is required to afford a onebedroom apartment at the local fair market rent. 14 In major
American cities, almost a fifth of homeless persons with children
reported being employed. 15 While homeless shelters are often
thought of as temporary, the average length of stay in a shelter
16
for a household with children is almost six months.
Despite the prevalence of restrictive admissions policies for
homeless shelters and their clear classification as facially discriminatory, they have rarely been subject to litigation. Recently,
however, the issue was brought to the foreground when the
Ninth Circuit addressed such a policy.17 In a controversial ruling,
the Ninth Circuit found that a men-only policy for a homeless
shelter may violate the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),' 8 though they
noted in a footnote that the applicability of the FHA to homeless
shelters generally was unresolved.19
This Comment seeks to assist in resolving that issue by exploring possible legal regimes that would follow from proposed
interpretations of the FHA. Little information about facially discriminatory policies in homeless shelters appears in the academic and legal literature. Part II documents the existence of such
policies and the potential effects of these policies on the homeless
12 Jacobs, Little, and Almeida, 2 J Soc Distress & Homeless at 283 (cited in note 9)
(noting that the common policies rejecting adolescent males in family shelters leave adoclescent males on their own to seek shelter).
13 It is estimated that as many as 3.5 million individuals experience homelessness in
a given year in the United States, and the population has grown dramatically. The Urban
Institute, A New Look at Homelessness in America (2000), available at <http://www.
urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900302> (last visited May 3, 2009). There is reason to fear that the
current financial downturn may accelerate the growth of this population. US Conference
of Mayors, A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities: A 23-City
Survey, 17 (2007), available at <http://www.usmayors.org[HHSurvey2007/hhsurvey
07.pdf> (last visited Apr 29, 2009) (reporting that most major cities surveyed expected to
see increases in the need for services for the homeless because of the economic downturn).
14 National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2007-2008, 3, 14 (2008),
available at <http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2008/> (last visited May 3, 2009).
15 US Conference of Mayors, Report on Hunger and Homelessness at 15 (cited in note
13).
16 Id at 16.

17 Community House, 490 F3d at 1048-51.
18 Id.
19 Id at 1048 n 2.
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and society. Part III describes the current state of housing discrimination law with respect to homeless shelters. Between constitutional protections, federal fair housing statutes, executive
orders, and state and local fair housing requirements, there is
little doubt that there are existing protections for certain classes
of individuals in homeless shelters. Due to ambiguity in the definition of "dwelling" in the FHA, however, whether occupants of
homeless shelters are protected from discrimination based on sex
and familial status by the FHA remains in doubt. Part III explores the few cases that have addressed this ambiguity and discusses potential justifications for facially discriminatory policies
under the FHA. Part IV explores the implications of interpreting
the FHA to cover homeless shelters, sketching the outlines of
potential legal regimes under the existing statute. Part V concludes by identifying empirical questions in need of further study
to help resolve this issue.
While this Comment largely focuses on the negative consequences of restrictive admissions guidelines, it should not be
read as an indictment of all such policies. There are legitimate
safety, privacy, and resource concerns which may justify such
rules, 20 and courts have recognized exceptions to the FHA that
would allow facially discriminatory policies for such reasons. 21
The focus is on negative effects because most are not found elsewhere in the legal literature and are little studied in any field.
This Comment seeks to begin to fill this gap by drawing attention to the collateral consequences of shelter admission policies.
It argues that these effects deserve consideration and argues for
an interpretation of the FHA which would allow courts to be a
forum for that consideration.

II. FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES IN HOMELESS SHELTERS
Homeless shelters routinely and openly maintain policies
that treat homeless individuals differently based on their membership in protected classes. Known as facially discriminatory
20 Mottet and Ohle, Transitioning Our Shelters at 2 (cited in note 6) (identifying
safety and privacy as key concerns to shelter administrators in maintaining sexsegregation); Shelter Partnership, Inc., Operating at Capacity: Family Shelters in Los
Angeles County, 19 (2006), available at <http://www.shelterpartnership.orgdocuments/
FinalFamilyReportOOO.pdf> (last visited Apr 29, 2009) (identifying funding as a chief
concern motivating restrictive admissions policies).
21 See, for example, Familystyle of St. Paul v City of St. Paul, 923 F2d 91, 94 (8th Cir
1991); Bangerter v Orem City Corp, 46 F3d 1491, 1503-04 (10th Cir 1995). For a discussion of these exceptions to the FHA, see Part 1I, B, 4.
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policies to the courts, 22 these policies may have impacts that go
beyond leaving some homeless individuals without shelter.
A.

The Prevalence and Scope of Facially Discriminatory Policies
in Homeless Shelters

Social scientists, though rarely targeting such policies for
study, have long documented the existence of facially discriminatory policies in homeless shelters with respect to sex, 23 familial
status, 24 religion, 25 and disability.26 Such policies based on race,
color, and national origin have not been documented recently,
27
and there is little reason to believe they exist.
Facially discriminatory policies typically come in the form of
admissions criteria. When homeless individuals seek shelter,
they are usually screened by staff at a homeless shelter or a central office guided by admissions criteria. 28 Some shelters, known
22 InternationalUnion v Johnson Controls, 499 US 187, 198 (1991) (defining facially
discriminatory policies).
23 See Victoria L. Banyard, Taking Another Route: Daily Survival Narratives from
Mothers Who Are Homeless, 23 Am J Community Psych 871, 875 (1995) (describing qualitative data collected in shelters for women and children in three Midwestern cities);
Weinreb and Rossi, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 95 (cited in note 5) (documenting different types of
homeless shelters); Jacobs, Little, and Almeida, 2 J Soc Distress & Homeless at (cited in
note 9) (documenting the admissions criteria for shelters nationwide); Elizabeth W. Lindsey, Service Providers' Perceptionof Factors that Help or Hinder Homeless Families, 79
Families in Socy 160, 165 (1998) (documenting which populations different shelters in
North Carolina and Georgia serve, including the percentages that do not serve men,
women, and families); McChesney, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 447 (cited in note 11) (noting that
men are considered nuisances at family shelters and are frequently excluded); Stephen
Metraux and Dennis P. Culhane, Family Dynamics, Housing, and Recurring Homelessness Among Women in New York City Homeless Shelters, 20 J Fam Issues 371, 373-375
(1999) (documenting the parsing of the homeless population by the New York Department
of Homeless Services into two separate systems, one for families and one for individuals);
Cynthia Rocha, et al, Predictorsof Permanent Housing for Sheltered Homeless Families,
77 Families in Socy 50, 51 (1996) (noting that shelters in their study welcomed all types
of homeless families, including those with teenage children unlike other shelters in St.
Louis); Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 366 (1994) (cited in note 10) (analyzing the selectivity of
shelter admissions policies); Shirley P. Thrasher and Carol T. Mowbray, A Strengths
Perspective: An Ethnographic Study of Homeless Women with Children, 20 Health and
Soc Work 93, 94 (1995) (studying three shelters in the Detroit metropolitan area, one
mixed-use and two exclusive to families and women).
24 Id.
25 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 368 (cited in note 10) (documenting mandatory attendance
at religious services policies for shelter residents).
26 Weinreb and Rossi, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 95-96 (cited in note 5) (documenting the
admissions criteria for shelters nationwide finding that 39 percent of shelters exclude the
mentally ill).
27 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 380 (cited in note 10) (noting that discrimination based on
race, color, and national origin has not been seen).
28 Weinreb and Rossi, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 95 (cited in note 5) (describing how restrictive intake procedures function).
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as mixed-use, do not have policies that restrict based on sex or
familial status. These shelters do not exclude at all or exclude
based on other characteristics such as substance abuse. However, many shelters are defined by the sex and familial restrictions
they impose. If it is a men-only shelter, then only men gain admission. If women-only, then only women gain admission. If it is
a family shelter, then generally only parents with young children
are allowed, though different shelters often define "family" differently. "In some instances, shelters will only accept mothers accompanied by their children, a practice that means that fathers
are often sent off to a single men's shelter."29 Such policies openly
treat individuals differently based on their sex and familial status.
In addition to these basic restrictions, which define the type
of shelter (family, men-only, women-only, and mixed-use), there
are often further restrictions. Common among these for family
shelters are bans on drug abusers, alcohol abusers, spousal abusers, child abusers, the mentally ill, the physically ill, large
families, adolescent males, and those with a criminal record. 30 It
is striking to note that large families and families with adolescent males are often treated the same as active alcohol and drug
abusers. Families with adolescent males are more likely to be
excluded than individuals with records of child abuse; one study
found that 40 percent of family shelters exclude families because
31
of the presence of adolescent males.
There is reason to believe that the use of these policies is expanding. One recent study of shelters in Los Angeles County
found that almost 40 percent of shelters reported instituting
more restrictive entry requirements in the last three years, while
fewer than 5 percent lessened their requirements. 32 The study
did not determine whether the policies became more restrictive
with respect to sex or familial status but did note that family
type and sobriety were the two most common restrictions.3 3
Additionally, it should be noted that the vast majority of
homeless shelters of all types receive government funding.
"[Although the vast majority (86%-95%) are run by private organizations, the shelters obtain anywhere from 29% to over 50%
29

30
31
32
33

Id.
Id at 96 (documenting common restrictive admissions policies at shelters).
Jacobs, Little, and Almeida, 2 J Soc Distress & Homeless at 278 (cited in note 9).
Shelter Partnership, Operatingat Capacityat 19 (cited in note 20).
Id at 16-19-
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of their funds from governmental sources, with almost every
shelter receiving some funds from the federal government."34 As
discussed in Part III, this public funding has important implications in triggering certain prohibitions against discrimination.
B.

The Societal Impact of Discriminatory Policies

According to the best national estimate, as many as 3.5 million people are likely to experience homelessness in a given
year. 35 It is estimated that twelve million Americans will experience homelessness in their lifetime. 36 There are more than
750,000 homeless individuals in the United States on a given day
with an average of 335,000 of those residing in shelters and transitional housing. 37 Almost 600,000 families with 1.35 million
children experience homelessness every year in the United
States, 38 and the homeless population is growing.
Homelessness tripled in 182 large cities between 1981 and
1989. 39 A 2007 survey of twenty-three major American cities reported that fifteen predicted that requests for emergency shelters
would increase in 2008, and all twenty-three predicted increases
in requests from households with children. 40 "Officials in these
cities cited the foreclosure crisis, increases in poverty, and a pattern of steady increases in the numbers of homeless families entering the homeless system during the year as reasons to expect
an increase in requests for emergency shelter in 2008."41
This growth in the size of the homeless population over the
last few decades has been nearly paralleled by growth in shelter
capacity. A study found that shelter capacity in nine major U.S.
34 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 373 (cited in note 10).
35 Urban Institute, A New Look at Homelessness (cited in note 13).
36 Bruce Link, et al, Lifetime and Five-Year Prevalenceof Homelessness in the United
States: New Evidence on an Old Debate, 65 Am J Orthopsych 347, 353 (1995).
37 US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Development, The Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, iii (2007)
(last visited Apr 29,
available at <http://www.huduser.org[Publications/pdf/ahar.pdf
2009) (estimating based on statistics from three different surveys).
38 National Alliance to End Homelessness, Promising Strategies to End Family
Homelessness, 1 (2006), available at <http://www.endhomelessness.orgtsection/policy/
focusareas/families> (last visited Apr 29, 2009).
39 Nicole E. Esparza, Dissertation, Shelters, Soup Kitchens, and Supportive Housing:
An Open Systems Analysis of the Field of Homeless Assistance Organizations17 (Princeton, Department of Sociology 2007) (discussing various attempts to measure extreme
poverty and homelessness in the United States).
40 US Conference of Mayors, Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness at 17 (cited
in note 13).
41 Id.
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communities doubled between 1987 and 1997,42 and the number
of homeless assistance organizations increased by roughly 40
percent from 1989 to 2002. 43 The growth in the homeless population and number of shelters has brought, and will continue to
bring, more and more individuals in contact with the facially discriminatory shelter policies documented above.
The most obvious impact of these discriminatory policies is
that some homeless individuals are denied shelter when they
request it. No data is kept on how many individuals are denied
admission based on admissions criteria, what percentage are
able to find another source of shelter, or the quality of the alternative shelter that is secured. The only evidence of what is likely
a substantial harm to the affected population is either inferential
or anecdotal. Of 750,000 individuals estimated to experience
homelessness each day, only 335,000 are housed in shelters and
transitional housing. 44 How many of the 55 percent who remain
unhoused never seek shelter, how many are turned away based
on restrictive admissions policies, and how many are turned
away for capacity and other reasons is undocumented. Anecdotally, the Ninth Circuit in Community House, Inc v City of Boise45
noted that the women and children displaced when their shelter
instituted a men-only policy experienced "significant hardship"
46
and had to move into "much less desirable housing."
The consequences of leaving people unsheltered are dire. Inadequate housing often involves a lack of access to safe water for
drinking and personal hygiene, proper disposal of sewage, and
facilities for safe food preparation in addition to protection from
extreme temperatures and natural hazards. 47 Living on the
streets presents "a unique set of hardships beyond those presented by poor quality housing." 48 In addition to being at a higher risk for developing new medical conditions, chronic medical
conditions commonly worsen, 49 and death from disease and expo42 National Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness in America: Unabated and
Increasing,Washington, DC: The National Coalition for the Homeless (1997).
43 Esparza, Shelters, Soup Kitchens, and Supportive Housing at 18 (cited in note 39).
44 HUD, Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress at iii (cited in note 37).
45 490 F3d 1041 (9th Cir 2007).
46 Id at 1046.

47 Thomas D. Matte and David E. Jacobs, Housing and Health: Current Issues and
Implications for Research and Programs, 77 J Urban Health: Bull NY Acad Med 7, 9
(2000).
48 Id.

49 Id at 10 (noting the difficulty of storing insulin and securing a diabetic diet for a
diabetic homeless individual, illustrating the struggle of maintaining a regular medical
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sure is a very real concern for the unsheltered. 50 In addition, individuals living on the streets are frequently subject to vi51
olence.
The harm of leaving people unsheltered is largely mitigated
in cities with "right-to-shelter" policies. In these cities, all homeless persons are taken to shelters with admissions policies that
will accept them. In a survey of twenty-three major American
cities, eleven reported not turning individuals away. 52 Some of
these cities, such as Miami, have policies that no family will be
turned away.5 3 Others, such as New York, have a court-created
right to shelter. 54 While the increased burden of being transported to another shelter may result in some individuals opting
to stay on the streets, it is unlikely this is a large population, and
the number of homeless individuals without shelter as a result of
restrictive admissions criteria is likely far smaller in communities with such policies.
Even in cities that provide some form of shelter for excluded
individuals, there is reason to believe that there are harmful collateral consequences of these policies that are widely felt. One
such collateral consequence is the alteration of the composition of
the low-income population. Facially discriminatory policies shape
regimen).
50 Over a seven-and-one-half year period, Los Angeles County averaged more than
one death per day in its homeless population with a concentration of deaths in winter.
Cardiovascular problems, substance use, and trauma were the leading causes of death.
Even in the Los Angeles climate, more than one person per year died of exposure, and
pneumonia was the fifth leading cause of death. See National Coalition for the Homeless,
Dying without Dignity: Homeless Deaths in Los Angeles County: 2000-2007, 9-13 (2007),
available at <http://nationalhomeless.org/publications/hatecrimeshatecrimes2007.pdf>
(last visited June 8, 2009). See also T. Murphy, et al, Hypothermia-Related Deaths - United States, 1999-2002 and 2005, 55 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 282 (Mar 17,
2006) (identifying homelessness as a risk factor for hypothermia).
51 National Coalition for the Homeless, Hate, Violence, and Death on Main Street
USA- A Report on Hate Crimes and Violence Against People Experiencing Homelessness
at <http://nationalhomeless.org/publicationslhatecrimeshatecrimes
2007, available
2007.pdf> (last visited June 8, 2009) (chronicling the regular violence homeless individuals face); Angie C. Kennedy, Homelessness, Violence Exposure, and School Participation
Among Urban Adolescent Mothers, 35 J Community Psych 639, 639-41 (2007) (identifying
street victimization, poor school outcomes, and family violence as prevalent among homeless adolescents); Matte and Jacobs, 77 J Urban Health: Bull NY Acad Med at 10 (cited in
note 47) (noting that homeless women may experience more severe physical and sexual
abuse during their lifetimes).
52 US Conference of Mayors, Report on Hunger and Homelessness, at 17 (cited in note
13).
53 Id.
54 See Callahan v Carey, 307 AD 2d 150, 153-55 (NY App 2003) (referencing a 1981
consent decree requiring New York City to provide shelter to homeless men meeting
certain criteria).
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the structure of the low-income population. For example, through
restrictive admissions policies, "shelters have defined the composition of the families constituting the homeless family population."55 Policies that only admit mothers with children, as opposed to couples with children, increase the proportion of femaleheaded households among homeless families. Shelters that do
not allow large families or families with adolescents distort the
age structure toward larger proportions of young mothers. 56
Additionally, facially discriminatory admissions policies often require families to separate to receive shelter and are thereby particularly damaging to the family structure. Researchers
have suggested that restrictive admissions policies may contribute to the dissolution of low-income families. 57 Homeless teenage boys are particularly targeted for exclusion and often are
left to fend for themselves. Families in need of social services can
rarely find housing that will both accept them and provide the
necessary services. 58 Restrictive admissions policies may encourage families to place children in foster care. 59 As one study summarized, "it makes the difficult task of maintaining a 'normal'
family (husband, wife, and children) that much more difficult." 60
Researchers have also noted the impact of these policies on
the social support of homeless families. Lack of social support is
a risk factor for homelessness. 61 These policies weaken the social
support of the homeless and perhaps contribute to continued
homelessness by keeping the homeless apart from potential
sources of support. For example, policies which discourage men
from interacting with homeless single mothers deprive both
groups of potential marriage partners. If male partners were encouraged to interact with homeless families and were included in
the permanency planning process, more homeless parents might
marry. "[I]f our goal is to increase social support, we need a reversal of attitude toward men in shelter policies and programs."62
All of these impacts can be long-lasting and likely shape the
composition of low-income households even after they leave the
55 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 379 (cited in note 10) (emphasis in original omitted).
56 Id (giving examples of how shelter exclusion policies distort the composition of lowincome families).
57 Jacobs, Little, and Almeida, 2 J Soc Distress & Homeless at 283 (cited in note 9).
58 Id.

59 Id.
60 Id.

61 McChesney, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 443-44 (cited in note 11).
62 Id at 447.
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shelters. Considering that 12 million Americans will experience
homelessness in their lifetime, 63 yet only 750,000 are homeless
on any given day, 64 it is clear that the effects of discriminatory
policies have the potential to touch populations beyond those
currently residing in shelters. While no study has been conducted on the matter, there is a risk that, even after leaving the
shelter, households continue to be headed by single women with
lower levels of social support, children continue to remain in foster care, and adolescent males who have lived alone on the
streets continue to utilize whatever skills helped them survive
when they were separated from their families.
Another important impact, largely unstudied by social scientists in this domain but readily acknowledged by the legal community, is the humiliation caused by discrimination. The recognition of the gravity of this harm was a chief motivator in the
enactment of civil rights legislation. As noted in Boyle v. Jerome
Country Club, "Congress enacted Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to 'vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."' 6 5 This deprivation of personal dignity is present every
time a homeless adolescent is turned away or a father is forced to
separate from his family for them to find shelter.
Of course, there are some benefits to these restrictive admissions criteria. One key concern is that serving a mixed population will strain shelter resources. With this in mind, shelters establish entry requirements based on various factors including
the target population (for example, substance users or victims of
66
abuse), the physical configuration of the facility, and capacity.
"An agency may establish more restrictive admissions criteria
due to funding requirements or as a way to facilitate client
movement through the program." 67 More restrictive policies
might yield a resident population that is higher functioning and
more compliant, allowing the shelter to serve more clients more
cheaply. 68 In Community House, the shelter providers argued
Link, et al, 65 Am J Orthopsych at 353 (cited in note 36).
HUD, Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress at iii (cited in note 37).
65 883 F Supp 1422, 1428 (D Idaho 1995) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379 US 241, 250 (1964), quoting S Rep No 88-872).
66 Shelter Partnership, Operatingat Capacity at 16 (cited in note 20).
67 Id at 19.
68 Jacobs, Little, and Almeida acknowledge the tradeoffs in developing admissions
63
64

policies without arguing that current admissions policies have struck the proper balance.
After noting that such policies seek the higher functioning members of the homeless
population, they ask, "And where, if at all, are those lower functioning, less compliant]
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that running a men-only shelter allowed them the resources to
69
open additional accommodations for women and children.
The theoretical literature on organizational behavior provides one explanation for the concern over resource stretching.
According to resource dependence theory, an organization, such
as a homeless shelter, confronted with a potentially heterogeneous client population and limited resources will seek homogeneous clients because a complex client population puts pressure on
the organization to provide a wide range of services. 70 By seeking
like clients, organizations limit themselves to like services. While
the power of this theory is more fully explored in predicting organizational behavior based on the environment, it is enough for
our purposes to note the logic underlying the discriminatory
practices of organizations.
In addition to resource concerns, guidelines for managing
homeless shelters identify safety and privacy as key concerns for
homeless shelters maintaining sex-segregated policies. 71 In
Community House, the shelter provider argued that "the difficulties of serving the homeless population are exacerbated in a
mixed gender shelter environment. 72 Specifically, they argued
that the policy protected the safety of women and children. 73 The
Ninth Circuit additionally noted that a privacy justification may
exist for these discriminatory admissions policies if, for example,
74
occupants of the shelter did not have their own rooms.
Even given these appreciable benefits, considering the
mounting evidence of large, society-wide impacts of these policies, it may well be time to revisit whether they should be allowed to continue, and the courts may provide a forum for that
consideration to take place. The next section will discuss the legal rights of homeless individuals to challenge these policies in
court.

families being sheltered?" Jacobs, Little, and Almeida, 2 J Soc Distress & Homeless at
285 (cited in note 9).
69 Community House, 490 F3d at 1051.
70 Marianne Goodfellow, Rural Homeless Shelters: A Comparative Analysis, 8 J Soc
Distress & Homeless 21, 22-23 (1999).
71 Mottet and Ohle, Transitioning Our Shelters at 2 (cited in note 6) (identifying
safety and privacy as concerns of shelter administrators in integrating trans-gendered
persons into the shelters).
72 Community House, 490 F3d at 1046 (quotation marks omitted).
73 Id at 1051.
74 Id at 1051 n 6.
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III. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS TO CHALLENGE
FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES

Fair housing law provides a patchwork of protections against
facially discriminatory policies. While this Comment focuses on
discrimination based on sex and familial status, this Part will
briefly address fair housing laws with respect to other protected
classes as well. It does so to address interactions both within and
between fair housing laws. First, laws often ban multiple types of
discrimination using the same language. Interpretations of fair
housing law that affect discrimination based on sex and familial
status often have an influence on the protections offered to other
protected classes. For example, because the provision banning
discrimination in "dwellings" in the FHA applies to race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, 75 altering the
interpretation of "dwelling" to benefit the subjects of sex and familial discrimination would also alter the interpretation with
regard to the other classes.
Second, protections in different fair housing laws interact
with one another. If courts follow the canon to avoid redundancy,
changes in the interpretation of one law may affect the coverage
of another. For example, some courts have recognized a distinction between "public accommodations"-deserving of Title II protection-and "dwellings"-deserving of FHA protection. 76 Placing
homeless shelters into one category may result in their exclusion
from the other.
It is likely that we, like the Supreme Court, 77 vary in our
aversion to types of discrimination. For example, we might be
more comfortable with shelter admissions policies which discriminate based on sex or familial status than with shelter admissions policies which discriminate based on religion or race.
Knowing that religious and racial discrimination in shelters is
likely barred by Title 11,78 even if courts find it is not barred by
75 42 USC § 3604(a) (2006).
76 Patel v Holley House Motels, 483 F Supp 374, 381 (holding that a motel is a public
accommodation not a dwelling under the FHA).
77 The Court has a higher comfort level with discrimination based on gender than
based on race as is apparent from the three-tiered equal protections framework the Court
has developed, discussed below. Compare Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458
US 718, 724-26 (1982) (holding gender a semi-suspect classification and requiring the
government provide an important, but not necessarily compelling, interest to not violate
the fourteenth amendment), with Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 11 (1967) (finding race a
suspect classification, requiring a compelling state interest for the regulation to stand).
78 42 USC § 2000a(b)(1) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommoda-
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the FHA, may lead us to favor an interpretation of the FHA that
does not include shelters, confident that there is still a means to
address the less favored discrimination. Knowing the background rules of fair housing law allows us to tailor our legal regime based on our preferences.
Section A of this Part gives a brief summary of fair housing
laws that are likely to prohibit some discrimination in homeless
shelters, even if the FHA is found not to. Section B discusses the
protections that may be offered to occupants of homeless shelters
by the FHA and discusses recent cases addressing the issue.
A.

Non-FHA Fair Housing Requirements
1. The Equal Protection Clause.

The Fourteenth Amendment commands that a state not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."7 9 In order for the Fourteenth Amendment to apply, the
element of state action is essential.8 0 This is easily established in
cases where the government builds and operates housing.8 1 It is
also relatively easily proven when the government approves and
subsidizes housing.8 2 State action can also be proven by establishing that private parties are performing public functions normally assumed by the state,83 or where the state has entered into
a symbiotic relationship with private parties.8 4 Given that the
vast majority of private shelters are publicly subsidized,8 5 it is
likely that state action may be established for many homeless
shelters.

tions); O'Neal v Porchlight,Inc, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 35750, *20-*21 (W D Wis) (assuming, without deciding, that a homeless shelter is a public accommodation and therefore
Title II applies).
79 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
80 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3,13-14 (1883).
81 See, for example, Escalera v New York City Housing Authority, 425 F2d 853, 861
(2d Cir 1970) (involving public housing).
82 See, for example, Swann v Gastonia Housing Authority, 675 F2d 1342, 1346 (4th
Cir 1982) (holding that eviction from § 8 housing constitutes state action); but see Miller v
HartwoodApartments, Ltd., 689 F2d 1239, 1243-44 (5th Cir 1982) (holding that it is not
a state action to evict in § 8 subsidized private housing).
83 See, for example, Evans v Newton, 382 US 296, 301-302 (1966) (private park
treated as public where the state acted as trustee).
84 See, for example, Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715, 724-26
(1961) (holding that partnership in leased facilities with clear public character is a state
action that implicates the Equal Protection Clause).
85 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 373 (cited in note 10).
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Once state action is established, courts apply a three-tiered
formula for determining whether equal protection has been violated. According to this formula, courts apply strict scrutiny
when a classification is deemed "suspect" or a fundamental right
is at issue.8 6 This level of scrutiny requires that the regulation in
question serve a compelling state interest, such as national security, and that there be no less restrictive alternative means for
89
88
87
the state to achieve its objectives. Race and national origin
have been deemed suspect classifications, and examples of fundamental rights include voting, 90 access to the courts, 91 and the
92
right to travel.
The second tier of scrutiny is applied when a "semi-suspect"
classification is at interest. When such an interest is at stake,
courts require that the regulation substantially serve an important government interest, albeit one that is less than compelling,
93
in order for the regulation to not violate equal protections.
Gender 94 and alienage 95 have been held to be semi-suspect classifications.
Finally, in matters involving social and economic legislation,
the courts grant extreme deference to legislative and administrative acts, requiring only that there be some rational relationship

86 See, for example, Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 216 (1944) (applying
strict scrutiny to a classification based on national origin).
87 Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 335 (1972) (holding that the state must show a
substantial and compelling state reason for imposing durational residence requirements
for voting).
88 Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 11 (1967) (finding race a suspect classification, requiring a compelling state interest for the regulation to stand).
89 Hernandez v Texas, 347 US 475, 477-78 (1954) (finding national origin a suspect
classification, requiring a compelling state interest for the regulation to stand).
90 Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663, 666 (1966) (holding that the
state violates the Equal Protection Clause when it makes affluence of the voter or a poll
tax the standard for voting).
91 Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause demands that the court system cannot invidiously discriminate between people or groups of
people).
92 Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 634 (1969) (holding that moving between states
is a constitutional right, and the state can only limit that right to the extent necessary to
promote a compelling government interest).
93 Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197-98 (1976).
9' Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 724-26 (1982) (finding
gender a semi-suspect classification and requiring the government provide an important,
but not necessarily compelling, interest to not violate the fourteenth amendment).
95 Ambach v Norwick, 441 US 68, 73-74 (1979) (finding alienage a semi-suspect classification and requiring the government provide an important, but not necessary compelling, interest to not violate the fourteenth amendment).
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to a legitimate state purpose. 96 For example, a court confronted
with an allegation of familial discrimination held that a university policy that excluded children from married student housing
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there was a
state of facts that could reasonably be conceived to justify it. 97
Disability also falls into this level of scrutiny. 98
Where the fourteenth amendment is violated, litigation may
be brought under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 99
2. The Establishment Clause.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides
a means of challenging religious discrimination in homeless shelters, such as mandatory religious services requirements. The
Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." 100 Whether the Establishment Clause is applicable depends on the presence and function of state action.
Most homeless shelters receive some level of government
funding. 10 1 Community House provides an example of the test for
determining whether the policies of a private organization that
receives government aid violate the Establishment Clause. 102
Government aid to religious organizations "survives an Establishment Clause challenge if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has
a primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, and
(3) does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion." 10 3 At issue in Community House was a lease between the
City of Boise and the Boise Rescue Mission Ministries to administer a shelter. The court found that even though the City
leased the shelter to the Ministries for valid secular purposes,
the lease violated the Establishment Clause because it gave the
Ministries a heavily subsidized platform to spread their religious
message, having the effect of advancing religion. 10 4 The Ninth
Circuit found that the City's lease with the Ministries required
96 McGowan v Marland,366 US 420, 425-26 (1961).
97 Bynes v Toll, 512 F2d 252, 257 (2d Cir 1975).
98 City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 446 (1985).
99 42 USC § 1983 (2006) (granting a private right of action to individuals deprived of
constitutional rights by the government).
100 US Const Amend I.
101 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 373 (cited in note 10).
102 Community House, 490 F3d at 1054-60.
103 Id at 1054-55.
104 Id at 1057-59

FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICIESAND THE FHA

459]

475

an injunction not only against forcing occupants to participate in
religious services but also against holding voluntary religious
10 5
services in the building.
3. Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Congress first created protections against housing discrimination when it passed section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.106 This act established that "[a]ll citizens" had the same
right as "white citizens" to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property." 10 7 While initially the law
was only thought to reach public action, that changed in 1968
when the Supreme Court held in Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co'0
that section 1982 applied to private discrimination as well.
Claims brought under section 1982 are independent from those
brought under the FHA, and claims may be brought concurrent09
ly.1
It is unclear whether section 1982 applies to homeless shelters. While no court has held it applicable to a shelter, courts
have interpreted section 1982 liberally." 0 It should be noted that
the question is likely purely academic since section 1982 only
applies to racial discrimination,"' and there is no documentation
of homeless shelters with facially discriminatory racial policies.
4. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in public accommodations. 112 Places of public accommodation within the
meaning of Title II include "any inn, hotel, motel or other estab-

105

Id 1059-60 (holding that the lower court abused its discretion by not granting the

plaintiff a preliminary injunction).
106 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 USC § 1982 (2006).
107

Id.

108 392 US 409, 436 (1968).
109 See, for example, Village of Bellwood v Gorey and Associates, 664 F Supp 320, 328
(N D Ill 1987).
110 See, for example, Tillman v Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 410 US 431,
437 (1973) (holding that 1982 prohibited discrimination in access to neighborhood amenities); Terry v Elmwood Cemetery, 307 F Supp 369, 371-72 (N D Ala 1969) (holding that
1982 applies to cemetery plots under a broad interpretation of "property").
Ill Racial discrimination as race was understood at the time section 1982 was
enacted, which includes Jews and Arabs as separate races. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v Cobb, 481 US 615, 617-18 (1987).

112 42 USC §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (2006).
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lishment which provides lodging to transient guests." 113 Whether
an establishment is a "public accommodation" depends on
whether it provides lodging to "transient guests," but not all
guests need be transient in order for the establishment to qualify. If some guests are transient, it is immaterial that the majority are permanent residents. 114 No definition of "transient guest"
is given by the statute, and no court has found it necessary to
define the term, though occupancy for a week or less has been
' 15
considered "transient."
Although no court has explicitly held that a homeless shelter
is a "public accommodation," one court assumed that it was. In
O'Neal v Porchlight,Inc, an occupant of an emergency homeless
shelter brought suit alleging racial discrimination by the staff,
among other complaints. 116 The court noted that the pro se plaintiff was "not a stranger to this court" having filed three earlier
lawsuits and characterized his complaint as "scattershot allegations with irrelevant words or phrases."" 7 After assuming Title
II applied to homeless slelters for the purposes of the analysis,
the court dismissed the case on procedural grounds. 118 Given the
expansive language of Title II and the broad reading courts have
given it, 119 it is highly likely that future courts will find homeless
shelters to be "public accommodations."
Of the classes protected by Title II, only religious discrimination has been documented in homeless shelters. 20 Actions under Title II for religious discrimination have been exceedingly
rare. In one case alleging religious discrimination, a Mormon
alleged religious discrimination by his country club because it
held tournaments on Sundays, when his religion counseled
against recreational activities. 1 2 ' In another, practitioners of Judo alleged discrimination by the Judo rulemaking authority be113 42 USC § 2000a(b)(1) (2006).

114 Stout v YMCA, 404 F2d 687, 689 (5th Cir 1968) (holding that a YMCA was a public
accommodation within the meaning of Title II because transient guests stayed in rooms
there when they were available).
115 United States v YMCA, 310 F Supp 79 (D SC 1970).
116 2006 US Dist LEXIS 35750, "1-*2 (W D Wis).
117 Id at *2.
11s Id at *20-*22.

119 See, for example, Dean v Ashling, 409 F 2d 754, 755-56 (5th Cir 1969) (holding
that trailer parks are places of public accommodation); Nesmith v YMCA, 397 F 2d 96,
100 (4th Cir 1968) (holding that YMCAs are places of public accommodation).
120 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 380 (cited in note 10) (noting that admissions policies
which discriminate based on race, color, and national origin have not been documented).
121 Boyle v Jerome Country Club, 883 F Supp 1422 (D Idaho 1995).
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cause Judo rules require bowing to inanimate objects, which violated the practitioners' religious beliefs. 122 Neither claim was
successful, but the court in the Judo case did note that "Title II
precludes private and public actors from segregating or depriving
1' 23
individuals of services on account of their religion.
Title II includes an exemption for private clubs "not in fact
open to the public." 124 A series of Supreme Court cases has narrowed this exemption significantly, allowing Title II suits to succeed when the private club is used as a faqade to avoid the statute. 125 Successful exemptions have been rare. 126 It is unlikely
that homeless shelters would be able to be sufficiently selective
to qualify as a private club.
Even though Title II appears to apply to homeless shelters
and has few loopholes for shelters to avoid liability, it still may
prove ineffective at protecting occupants of homeless shelters
from facially discriminatory policies. Title II does not protect occupants from sex or family-based discrimination. The only relief
available under Title II is injunctive. 127 Though reasonable at128 givtorney's fees are ordinarily available to successful counsel,
en this limited form of relief and the limited means of the potential plaintiffs, it is understandable that Title II is rarely invoked
in response to discrimination in homeless shelters. As noted
above, though this act was passed in 1964, no court has ruled on
whether a homeless shelter is a public accommodation.

122 Akiyama v United States Judo Inc, 181 F Supp 2d 1179, 1181 (W D Wash 2002)
(injunctive relief denied by the court).
123 Id at 1185.

124 42 USC § 2000a(e) (2006).
125 See Daniel v Paul, 395 US 298, 307-308 (1969) (holding an outdoor recreational
facility was a public accommodation despite a twenty-five cent membership fee); Tillman,
410 US at 438-39 (holding that a pool association open to every white person did not
qualify for the private club exemption); Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160, 172 (1976) (holding that two private schools did not qualify because they advertised to members of the
general population).
126 See, for example, Solomon v Miami Woman's Club, 359 F Sup 41, 44-45 (S D Fla
1973) (finding that woman's club was a "private club" and was exempt from Civil Rights
Act and other anti-discrimination statutes); Welsh v Boy Scouts of America, 993 F2d 1267,
1269 (7th Cir 1993) (holding that the scouting organization was not a "public accommodation" or "place of public entertainment" under 42 USC § 2000a).
127 Adickes v SHKress & Co, 398 US 144, 150, n 5 (1970) (stating that the legislative
history is clear that Congress intended injunctive relief to be the exclusive remedy under
Title II).
128 Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc, 390 US 400, 402-403 (1968) (holding that
a litigant who successfully receives injunctive relief is entitled to recover attorneys fees
except when the circumstances of the case would make it unjust).
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Additionally, procedural requirements have proven to be
barriers to relief. Title II requires that, if the discrimination occurred in a state that prohibits it, an action cannot be brought
under Title II until thirty days after notifying the appropriate
state or local authority. 29 While this may seem to be a minor
inconvenience, with this vulnerable, transient population it may
be enough to prevent relief. In O'Neal the court avoided addressing the plaintiff's claims by dismissing because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 130 A similarly situated plaintiff faced the same fate in Chance v Reed. 131 Given that Title II
actions by homeless individuals are so rare, it is worth noting
this pattern of dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
5. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or
national origin, be excluded from any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'132 Housing programs assisted
by federal funds have been held to come within the reach of Title
133

VI.

Title VI only applies to programs receiving federal funds,
though its reach may extend beyond programs that receive federal funding directly. Title VI was amended by the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987,134 which subjected the entire program to
a ban on discrimination, not just the specifically funded program.
Courts have been mixed on the issue of whether the acceptance
of federal tax benefits bring recipient organizations within the
reach of Title VI.135 If the acceptance of tax breaks brings organizations within the reach of Title VI, it may prove a far more influential statute.
129 42 USC § 2000a-3(c) (2006).
130 O'Neal, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 35750 at *20-*21.
131 538 F Supp 2d 500, 510 (D Conn 2008) (dismissing on grounds that plaintiff did not
file claim with state agency within 180 days after alleged discriminatory act).
132 42 USC § 2000d (2006).
133 Hills v Gautreaux, 425 US 284, 297 (1976).
134 The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, codified at 42 USC § 2000d-4a (2006).
135 Compare McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F Supp 448, 461 (D DC 1972) (holding that
tax benefits enjoyed by non-profit organizations were a form of federal assistance which
brought its recipients within the reach of section 2000d) with Laramore v Illinois Sports
FacilitiesAuthority, 722 F Supp 443, 451 (N D Ill 1989) (tax exemption for bonds not
federal financial assistance implicating Title VI).
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Failure to comply with Title VI is punishable by termination
or refusal to grant or continue assistance, or by any other means
authorized by law. 136 Unlike Title II, the Supreme Court has held
that, at least when the program is intentionally discriminatory,
Title VI gives rise to a private right of action. 137 Procedurally,
Title VI requires the submission of an administrative complaint
to the applicable federal agency as a prerequisite to judicial re138
view.
Much like section 1982, Title VI's usefulness is limited by
the small number of classes it protects. Title VI does not protect
occupants of homeless shelters from discrimination based on religion, sex, or familial status. Since facially discriminatory policies based on race, color, and national origin-the categories protected by Title VI-are extremely rare if not nonexistent in
homeless shelters, the value of Title VI is negligible in the shelter context.
6. The Americans with Disabilities Act.
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") prohibits discrimination based on disability in both the public and private
sectors. 13 9 Much like Title VI, the ADA prohibits discrimination
in services and programs provided by the government, 140 but the
ADA goes beyond Title VI to include programs made available by
14
state and local governments as well as the federal government. '
In the private sector, the ADA prohibits discrimination by
any place of public accommodation. 142 In this way, the ADA mimics the patchwork of protections created by Title II and the FHA,
and much like that patchwork, it is unclear whether any given
homeless shelter falls under Title II or the ADA. Regulations
have been issued which give some guidance on when a shelter is
a "dwelling" under the FHA and when it is a "place of public ac136 42 USC § 2000d-1 (2006).
137 GuardiansAssociation v Civil Service Commission, 463 US 582, 592 (1983).
138 42 USC §§ 2000d-1, 2000d-2 (2006); 24 CFR §§ 1.1-.12 (regulations implementing
Title VI).
139 42 USC §§ 12101-12213. See generally Alicia H. Apfel, Comment, Cast Adrift:
Homeless Mentally Ill, Alcoholic, and DrugAddicted, 44 Cath U L Rev 551 (1995).
140 42 USC § 12132 (2006) ("[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity ... ").
141 42 USC § 12131(1)(A), (B) (2006) (defining public entity as including "any State or
local government" as well as "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State ... or local government").
142 42 USC § 12182(A) (2006).
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commodation" under the ADA. However, these regulations both
include homeless shelters and do not list any factors to guide the
decision. 143
7. Executive Order Number 11,063.
In 1962, President Kennedy signed Executive Order Number
11,063, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
or national origin in housing that is owned, operated, or assisted
by the federal government. 144 In 1980, President Carter extended
the order to cover sex-based discrimination. 145 In 1994, President
6
Clinton extended the order to disability and familial status. 14
The original order had little effect due to its failure to place
authority in a specific agency for enforcement. 14 7 Presidents
Carter and Clinton, however, updated the law to address this
failing. Carter established the authority for agency coordination
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 148
and Clinton created a cabinet-level Fair Housing Council to assure that federal programs affirmatively further fair housing.149
The current executive order requires agencies to determine
if their housing programs are discriminatory and, if so, to attempt to remedy any violations by informal means.1 50 If informal
means are unsuccessful, they are directed to impose "such sanctions as authorized by law,' 151 so the remedies offered by this
order will not exceed those offered by the laws discussed above.
Since the executive order applies to programs receiving grants,
loans, contracts, insurance, and guarantees through the federal

143 28 CFR § 36.104 (2009) (interpreting the ADA and defining a place of public accommodation as including a homeless shelter); 24 CFR § 100.201 (2009) (interpreting the
FHA with respect to disabilities and defining a dwelling as including "dormitory rooms
and sleeping accommodations in shelters intended for occupancy as a residence for homeless persons").
144 3 CFR § 652 (1963), reprinted in 42 USC § 1982 (2006).
145 Executive Order Number 12,259, 3 CFR § 307 (1981), reprinted in 42 USC § 3608
(2006).
146 Executive Order Number 12,892, 59 Fed Reg 2939 § 6-604 (1994).
147 3 CFR § 652 (cited in note 144) (placing responsibility for enforcement upon "all
departments and agencies in the executive branch of the federal government").
148 3 CFR § 307 (cited in note 145).
149 59 Fed Reg at 2940 (cited in note 146).
150 Id at § 5-502.
151 Id.
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government, 15 2 it is likely that this order affects most homeless
shelters as most receive federal support.153
8. State and local fair housing requirements.
The majority of states and many of the nation's cities and
counties have enacted fair housing legislation. 15 4 These requirements are highly varied but generally mirror the federal fair
housing statutes. Most prohibit discrimination based on race,
color, religion, and national origin, and recently marital status,
sex, and disability have been added to many. 15 5 A search of state
fair housing laws did not reveal any provisions specifically referring to applicability to homeless shelters. The Supreme Court
has held that the FHA "preserves and defers to local fair housing
laws," 156 so any protections offered by state and local requirements to occupants of homeless shelters would not be disrupted
by FHA coverage.
B.

Fair Housing Act
1. Background.
Under the FHA, it is unlawful to "make unavailable ... a

dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 157 It is also unlawful to "make
unavailable ... a dwelling ... because of a handicap."1 58 As

amended, the FHA provides protections to the largest number of
classes of the federal fair housing laws.
The FHA provides two procedures for vindicating a deprivation under the Act, an administrative proceeding and a civil action. 159 The remedies available under both procedures include
152 Id at § 1-102.
153 Rossi, 37 Am Beh Sci at 373 (cited in note 10) (noting that most privately run shelters receive some federal funding).
154 James A. Kushner, Fair Housing: Discrimination in Real Estate, Community Development, and Revitalization, § 1.06 (McGraw-Hill 1995); For sex discrimination, see
generally Jane M. Draper, Annotation, State Civil Rights Legislation Prohibiting Sex
Discriminationin Housing, 81 ALR 41h 205 (2008) (compiling state statutes and case law
concerning sex discrimination in housing).
155 2-16B Powell on Real Property § 16B.09 (2009).
156 Hunter v Erickson, 393 US 385, 388 (1969).
157 42 USC § 3604(a) (2006).
158 42 USC § 3604(0(1) (2006).
159 42 USC § 3610 (2006) (allowing aggrieved person to file a discriminatory housing
claim to the Secretary within one year); 42 USC § 3612 (2006) (allowing a party to the
complaint to elect to have the complaint heard in a hearing or in US district court); 42
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actual and punitive damages as well as injunctions including
affirmative orders.1 60 In civil actions, reasonable attorney's fees
are available to the prevailing party. 161 Of the fair housing laws,
the FHA provides both the widest range of protections and the
strongest of remedies.
2. "Dwellings" under the FHA.
The applicability of the FHA to homeless shelters is uncertain. The FHA makes it unlawful to "make unavailable ... a
dwelling" based on membership to a protected class, so whether
occupants of homeless shelters are protected is contingent on
whether the shelters are considered dwellings. Dwelling is defined as "any building, structure or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence
by one or more families."'162 No clarification of what constitutes a
"residence" is given.
The regulations interpreting the coverage of the FHA do not
clarify the legal status of homeless shelters. In the section dealing with handicap discrimination, the regulations specify that
"residences" within homeless shelters qualify as "dwellings."'163
However, homeless shelters are not mentioned in the regulations
for any of the other protected classes. 164 It is important to note
that the regulations for the disabled specify "residences" within
homeless shelters. Since the issue is what constitutes a "residence," the regulations do little more than clarify that, at least in
the context of discrimination against the disabled, homeless shelters may contain units that qualify as residences. They give no
further indication of what constitutes a "residence."
Thus, it is left to the courts to interpret this ambiguity. The
Supreme Court has never ruled on whether homeless shelters or
other temporary lodgings are protected by the FHA. The standard circuit courts have developed for determining whether a
structure is a "dwelling" is built upon the definition of "residence" found in United States v. Hughes Memorial Home: "a
temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode or habitation to
USC § 3613 (2006) (allowing aggrieved party to file a complaint in federal or state court
within two years of the alleged discrimination).
160 42 USC § 3612(o)(3), 3613(c)(1) (2006).
161 42 USC § 3613(c)(2) (2006).
162 42 USC § 3602(b) (2006).
163 24 CFR § 100.201 (2008).
164 24 CFR § 100.20 (2008).
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which one intends to return as distinguished from the place of
temporary sojourn or transient visit." 165 In applying this definition, courts have focused on factors including whether the occupants intend to remain in the structure for any significant period
of time, 166 whether they view the structure as a place to return
to, 167 and whether the structure was intended as a residence. 168
In searching for these elements, courts frequently look at the
length of time one expects to stay in the structure. 169 The central
premise is that the longer one expects to stay, the more likely
one is to qualify for the protections of the FHA. But while the
expected length of stay is important in determining FHA coverage, it is not dispositive, and courts have found a wide range of
durations to be sufficient to warrant FHA protection. In Lakeside
Resort Enterprises, LP v Board of Supervisors, the Third Circuit
found a facility with an average stay of only 14.8 days to be covered by the FHA.1 70 They noted that the facility was intended to
accommodate thirty-day stays as a matter of course and even
longer stays on occasion.17 1 In their analysis, they cited the fact
that the FHA refers to "any building, structure, or portion thereof,"1 72 reasoning that "[s]ome rooms in the facility-i.e., a 'portion thereof'-would house occupants staying for extended pe173
riods, thereby satisfying with ease the significant-stay factor."
Thus, if a court is able to cite any example of a significant stay, it
may find that the length of stay factor is met.
Other factors courts may consider in determining whether a
structure qualifies as a "dwelling" include whether the occupants
treated it like a home, 74 whether they had an alternative place
165 396 F Supp 544, 549 (W D Va 1975) (citing Webster's Third New International
Dictionary).
166 United States v Columbus Country Club, 915 F2d 877, 881 (3d Cir 1990) (holding
that summer homes are "dwellings" because residents intended to remain in them for
significant periods of time and to return).
167 Id.
168 Garcia v Condarco, 114 F Supp 2d 1158, 1160 (D NM 2000) (holding that a jail is
not a "dwelling" because it is intended as a penal institution, not a residence).
169 See, for example, Columbus Country Club, 915 F2d at 881 (ruling the club members were not "mere transients" because they may spend up to five months in their bungalows).
170 Lakeside Resort Enterprises, LP v Board of Supervisors, 455 F3d 154, 158-59 (3d
Cir 2006) (holding that a drug and alcohol treatment facility is considered a "dwelling"
under the FHA).
171 Id at 159.

172 Id, citing 42 USC § 3602(b).
173 Id.
174 Lakeside, 455 F3d at 160 (noting that residents hung pictures on the walls and
treated the facility as a home even though they were not allowed off the property unsu-
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of residence, 175 or whether the structure's purpose was to serve
as a residence. 176 Whether the occupants treated the structure
like a home is intimately bound to the question of whether they
viewed the structure as a place to return to. In Lakeside, the
Third Circuit looked to evidence such as receiving mail at the
facility, eating meals at the facility, returning to a designated
room, and hanging pictures on the wall to suggest that the occu1 77
pants treated it like a home.
The question of whether the individual had an alternative
place of residence was developed in response to a suit brought
against a homeless shelter. In Woods v Foster, the lack of an alternative residence was held to be evidence that the shelter was
treated as a residence by the homeless individuals. 7 8 This element has been cited by other courts considering whether struc179
tures qualify as "dwellings."'
In Garcia v Condarco, the court developed a new criterion
80
for determining whether a structure qualified as a "dwelling."'
In order to avoid giving protections to occupants of a city jail, the
court held that because the purpose of the jail was not as a residence, but rather as a penal institution, it was not a "dwelling."1'8 No court has expanded this "purpose" reasoning beyond
penal institutions, and there is little reason, given the much wider acceptance of the Woods reasoning, to believe courts would
expand it to exclude homeless shelters because their purpose is,
some may argue, rehabilitation or emergency shelter.
3. Past applications of the FHA to shelters.
While not heavily litigated, this continuing ambiguity in the
definition of "dwelling" has led to different outcomes in different
courts. Several district courts have applied the FHA to occupants
of homeless shelters without discussion of the definition of "dwel-

pervised).
175 Woods v Foster, 884 F Supp 1169, 1173 (N D Ill 1995).
176 Garcia, 114 F Supp 2d at 1160.
177 Lakeside, 455 F3d at 160.
178 884 F Supp 1169, 1173 (N D 11 1995).
179 See, for example, Villegas v Sandy Farms,Inc, 929 F Supp 1324, 1328 (D Or 1996)
(holding that cabins for migrant farm worker qualified as "dwellings" since, like homeless
shelters, the cabins were their only homes).
180 114 F Supp 2d 1158, 1160-62 (D NM 2000).
181 Id at 1161 (stating that the prison's purpose was as a penal facility as opposed to a
residence).
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ling." 18 2 Red Bull Associates v Best Western is typical of such cases. In Red Bull, the plaintiff motel alleged that a large motel association had revoked its membership because of animus towards
the minority homeless housed by the motel.183 The court assumed
without comment that the FHA was applicable to a motel that
18 4
had a contract to house the homeless.
One district court explicitly held that the FHA applies to
shelters.1 8 5 In Woods, the plaintiff occupants of a homeless shelter alleged sex discrimination because of severe sexual harassment by the supervisors of the homeless shelter. 186 In its analysis
of the "dwelling" question, the court cited with approval the
Hughes Memorial standard for determining whether a structure
is a "dwelling."18 7 Emphasizing whether the occupants view the
location as a place to which they will return, the court reasoned
that "[blecause the people who live in the Shelter have nowhere
else to 'return to,' the Shelter is their residence in the sense that
188
they live there and not in any other place."
One district court has explicitly questioned whether the
FHA applies to homeless shelters. In Johnson v Dixon, occupants
of two homeless shelters sought an injunction against the closing
of the homeless shelters, alleging that their closure would be unlawful discrimination based on the handicapped status of the
majority of the occupants.18 9 On the "dwelling" issue, the court
suggested that the FHA only protected "buyers" and "renters"
from unlawful discrimination and stated that it was doubtful
that emergency overnight shelters would qualify as a "dwelling."1 90 However, the court ruled against the homeless plaintiffs
on other grounds, avoiding a direct ruling on the "dwelling" is1 91

sue.

The Ninth Circuit has twice applied the FHA to homeless
shelters. Once, much like Red Bull, the court did so without discussion because the parties did not contend that it did not ap182 See, for example, Red Bull Associates v Best Western Intl, Inc, 686 F Supp 447, 451

(S D NY 1988); ProjectBASIC v. City of Providence, 1990 WL 429846 at *4-*5 (D RI).
183 Red Bull, 686 F Supp at 450.
184 Id at 451.

185 Woods, 884 F Supp at 1173.
186 Id at 1170-72.
187 Id at 1173.
188 Id at 1173-74.

189 786 F Supp 1, 4 (D DC 1991).
190 Id (noting that the conclusion would be the same even if the shelter seemed like a
home to the occupants).
191 Id at 4-5.
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ply, 192 and recently in Community House the court applied the
FHA to a homeless shelter without ruling on the "dwelling" issue
by noting that the homeless shelter also received rent for some
low-income units it managed, which meant it easily fell under
the FHA. 193 In a footnote in Community House, the court drew
attention to the ambiguity about the definition of "dwelling," noting that it had never squarely addressed the issue. 194 This footnote along with the controversial holding of Community Housethat a men-only policy for a homeless shelter may be in violation
of the FHA-has raised the profile of this long-standing issue
and highlighted the need for resolution. 195
4. Level of scrutiny for exceptions to the FHA.
Even if a shelter is found to be within the scope of the FHA
and the policy is found to be facially discriminatory, the policy
still may not violate the FHA. Courts have recognized exceptions
to the FHA that allow for members of protected classes to be
treated differently, requiring another step of analysis to determine if they are justified. 196 For example, if a discriminatory policy furthered an interest the courts recognize as legitimate,
courts may find the discrimination permissible. Courts are currently in disagreement over what level of scrutiny should be used
to determine whether the facially discriminatory policy is per197
mitted.
Courts have taken two approaches with the Eighth Circuit
taking a different approach than all other circuits. The Eighth
Circuit imported the equal protection tiers of scrutiny analysis
discussed above. If a public policy is shown to discriminate, the
government has the burden to demonstrate that its conduct was
necessary to promote a governmental interest commensurate
with the level of scrutiny afforded the class of people affected
192 Turning Point, Inc v City of Caldwel, 74 F3d 941, 942 (9th Cir 1996).
193 Community House, 490 F3d at 1048 n 2.
194

Id.
195 See generally Katherine Brinson, Note, Justifying Discrimination:How the Ninth
Circuit Circumvented the Intent of the Fair Housing Act, 38 Golden Gate U L Rev 489
(2008).
196 See, for example, Community House, 490 F3d at 1050 (discussing the approaches
adopted by the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits to determine whether different treatment of protected groups is justified).
197 Compare Oxford House-C v City of St. Louis, 77 F3d 249, 252 (8th Cir 1996) (using
an equal protection framework), with Bangerter v Orem City Corp, 46 F3d 1491, 1504
(10th Cir 1995) (using framework similar to Title VII framework).
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under the Equal Protection Clause. 198 As noted above, under
standard equal protection jurisprudence, familial discrimination
has been subject only to the rational basis test. 199 Under this level of scrutiny, the court asks if the discriminatory rule is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. If so, the discrimination is permitted. If not, the discrimination is not permitted. 200 The Eighth Circuit has not addressed a claim of sex discrimination using this framework for the FHA, but if they follow
the Supreme Court's treatment of sex discrimination under equal
protection, they will likely require the state to demonstrate that
a requirement substantially serves an important governmental
interest, a slightly higher threshold than rational basis. 20 1 It is
unclear what level of scrutiny the Eighth Circuit would use with
a purely private defendant, but given the pervasive subsidization
of shelters, such a defendant would be rare.
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have turned to Title
VII employment discrimination cases for guidance on exceptions
to the FHA's prohibition on facial discrimination. 202 The leading
case on this point in Title VII litigation is International Union v
Johnson Controls, Inc.20 3 In Johnson Controls, the Supreme
Court held that the appropriate test for whether a facially discriminatory policy was permissible was whether the policy was
justified by Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification exception. 20 4 This exception allows discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin "in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." 20 5 The Johnson Controls ap198 Familystyle of St. Paul v City of St. Paul, 923 F2d 91, 94 (8th Cir 1991) (discussing
the shifting burdens of proof in discriminatory policy cases); Oxford House, 77 F3d at 252.
199 Bynes v Toll, 512 F2d 252, 255 (2d Cir 1975) (holding that a university's policy of
excluding children from married housing was neither arbitrary nor irrational).
200 See, for example, Oxford House, 77 F3d at 252 (8th Cir 1996) (holding that St.
Louis did not violate the FHA despite a facially discriminatory zoning law because they
had a rational basis for enacting the rule).
201 Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 724-26 (1982) (finding
gender a semi-suspect classification and requiring the government to provide an important, but not necessarily compelling, interest to satisfy the fourteenth amendment).
202 Larkin v Michigan Department of Social Services, 89 F3d 285, 290 (6th Cir 1996)
(rejecting the Eighth Circuit approach); Community House, 490 F3d at 1050 (adopting the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits' approach); Bangerter, 46 F3d at 1503-04 (rejecting the Eighth
Circuit approach and adopting a framework similar to that used for Title VII cases).
203 499 US 187 (1991).
204 Id at 200.

205 Id (quoting 42 USC § 2000e-2).
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proach makes allowances for discriminatory policies only where
reasonably necessary, balancing the needs of companies against
the harms of discrimination.
In this spirit, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits require
individualized determinations of the impacts of the discriminatory practices to assess whether they should be excepted from the
FHA. For example, in Bangerter v Orem City Corp, the Tenth
Circuit held that to rebut a finding of facial discrimination, the
defendant must show either (1) that the ordinance is benign or
(2) that it responds to legitimate safety concerns based on the
particular individuals involved, not stereotypes. 2 6 Under the
benign exception, courts have repeatedly held that a benign motive is not sufficient. The effects of the policy must be benign regardless of intent. 20 7 This requires an individualized assessment
of the costs and benefits of the policy to the person claiming discrimination as well as the potential threat the party claiming
discrimination poses.
Which standard is chosen will ultimately have a large impact on the outcomes of shelter cases. The resolution of this circuit split may influence whether or not shelters are found to be
"dwellings" as courts take into account policy outcomes as they
resolve the ambiguity. If the Eight Circuit standard is followed,
it is likely that many of the restrictive admissions policiesincluding some of the more worrisome ones such as the ban on
large families-will be found to be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and therefore permitted. Generalized
interests in safety, stability, and tranquility have proven sufficient to satisfy rational basis review. 208 As noted above, justifications along these lines can be easily asserted for restrictive admissions policies.
If the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit standard is followed,
it will be much more difficult for such interests to justify an exception to the FHA for shelters. This is clearly illustrated by
Community House. Under the "benign" exception, the inquiry
focuses on the needs of the particular persons burdened by the
discrimination, not the community. 20 9 The court has to balance
the costs against the benefits of the discrimination for the indi206 46 F3d 1491, 1503-04 (10th Cir 1995).
207 See, for example, Larkin, 89 F3d at 290 (stating that a benign motive does not
prevent a law from being facially discriminatory).
208 See Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8-9 (1974).
209 Larkin, 89 F3d at 290.
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viduals facing discriminatory treatment. In Community House,
the City asserted that the men-only policy would benefit the
women and families displaced because it would allow them to
build an additional shelter for women and families at a later
date. 210 The court did not accept this argument, finding that the
City's plans to build a future shelter were not binding and that
the City failed to prove that the new shelter would be as desirable as the existing, men-only shelter. 211 As applied by the Ninth
Circuit, the benign exception calls for rigorous documentation of
the costs and benefits of the policy.
Under the safety exception, the safety concern cannot be
based on stereotypes. 21 2 In Community House, the Ninth Circuit
found that the City did not sufficiently support its contention
that a men-only policy was necessary to protect the safety of
women and families. 2 13 The only evidence given on this matter
was the opinion of the Executive Director that mixing genders
created an unstable shelter environment. 21 4 While the court left
the issue open on remand, without some documentation of this
danger the court was unwilling to accept that a men-only policy
215
was justified by concerns for the safety of women and families.
There are strong arguments in favor of this higher level of
scrutiny, and the judicial trend is to require it. Courts have preferred this standard because of the strength of the parallels to
Title VII litigation and the weakness of the parallels to equal
protection. Some classes of persons specifically protected by the
FHA are given extremely little protection for constitutional purposes. 21 6 By finding the classes of persons specifically protected
by the FHA to not be protected, these decisions in the equal protection case law run counter to the purpose of the FHA and its
amendments: to protect the classes enumerated from discrimination. 217 Community House was recently decided on this basis,
2 18
part of a trend everywhere outside of the Eighth Circuit. Most

210 Community House, 490 F3d at 1052.
211 Id.
212 Id at 1050.
213 Id at 1051.

214 Community House, 490 F3d at 1051.
215 Id.

216 See, for example, City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 446
(1985) (holding that the handicapped are not a suspect class).
217 Bangerter,46 F3d at 1503.
218 Community House, 490 F3d at 1050.
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district courts have followed this trend. 219 In considering the impact of differing protection regimes for homeless shelters, it is
useful to consider this trend towards higher scrutiny for facially
discriminatory policies.
IV. FINDING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION

Given this patchwork of protections, it is clear that some
level of protection is afforded to occupants of homeless shelters
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin,
and disability at the very least. Any shelter not found to fall
within the FHA is likely covered by Title II as a public accommodation; by the Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment
Clause, Title VI, the ADA, and Executive Order 11,063 because
of state funding; or by state and local fair housing requirements.
In deciding whether the FHA covers homeless shelters,
courts are deciding what sorts of discrimination to permit in
homeless shelters and what form of redress they are prepared to
afford those bringing suits. If a shelter is found to be covered by
the FHA, discrimination on the basis of all protected classes
would be actionable with fairly strong remedies. If the shelter is
found to be covered only by other fair housing law, sex and familial discrimination is far less likely to be actionable, and often
the remedy offered would be both procedurally and substantively
weaker. 220
This Part sets forth the rough outlines of two approaches
courts could take to addressing discrimination in homeless shelters: individualized and categorical. It goes on to explore the likely coverage of each approach and discuss the merits of each approach. Under the individualized approach, courts would individualize their assessments of each shelter, deciding which level of
protections to provide based on factors specific to each shelter.
Under the categorical approach, courts would treat homeless
shelters as a category of structure and give all the same level of
protection, regardless of individual factors.
219 See, for example, Community Housing Trust v Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 257 F Supp 2d 208, 228-29 (D DC 2003); United States v City of Chicago
Heights, 161 F Supp 2d 819, 843 (N D I1 2001); Children'sAlliance v City of Bellevue, 950
F Supp 1491, 1497-98 (W D Wash 1997); Alliance for the Mentally Ill v City of Naperville,
923 F Supp 1057, 1074-75 (N D Ill 1996).
220 This is likely because: 1) the low levels of scrutiny provided by the Equal Protection formula for sex and familial discrimination; 2) the absence of additional remedies in
Executive Order 11,063; and 3) the widely varying levels of protection provided by state
and local fair housing law.
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Basing Protections on Individual Factors

As noted above, the question of whether a structure qualifies
as a "dwelling" under the FHA has long turned on a number of
factors deemed important given the Hughes Memorial definition
of "residence." This section will look at the possibilities of determining the level of protections afforded a homeless shelter based
on the length of stay, whether the occupants treat it like a home,
-and the structure's intended purpose. These factors do not
represent mutually exclusive tests, and it is likely courts will
consider all factors in answering the question.
1. Protections contingent on length of stay.
In the shelter context, basing the determination on the intended length of stay has some appeal. Shelters already are often
categorized as either emergency or transitional. 221 Emergency
shelters typically provide housing for only short periods of time,
while transitional shelters provide longer-term housing while
occupants transition to the housing market. 222 Since any shelter
not covered by the FHA would likely be covered as a public accommodation under Title II, basing the level of protection on the
type of shelter would create a system with stratified protections.
Occupants of more home-like, transitional shelters would receive
protection from sex and familial discrimination under the FHA.
Occupants of emergency shelters, often no more than large rooms
with cots, would receive a lower level of protection from sex and
familial discrimination but still have constitutional and statutory
protections against other forms of discrimination.
This solution is likely to be attractive to some who have been
critical of some FHA cases dealing with homeless shelters. The
main argument against affording homeless individuals protections against sex and familial discrimination is the cost it would
impose on shelters. 223 The nightmare scenario is a rise in homeless individuals living on the streets as shelters have to make
costly upgrades in security, staffing, and even infrastructure to
handle mixed populations, reducing the resources available for
feeding and sheltering the population. This stratified system
221

Weinreb and Rossi, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 91-93 (cited in note 5) (documenting the

different types of homeless shelters).
222 Id.
223 Katherine Brinson, Note, Justifying Discrimination:How the Ninth Circuit Circumvented the Intent of the FairHousingAct, 38 Golden Gate U L Rev 489, 489 (2008).
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would allow facilities that operate emergency shelters segregated
based on sex and familial status to continue to do so, keeping
those in true emergency situations off the street cheaply and affording them a remedy-however weak-to prevent certain
forms of discrimination. Meanwhile, it would still address some
of the most damaging forms of familial discrimination, including
the exclusion of fathers and teenage sons from transitional family shelters.
Courts are likely to determine whether a shelter warrants
FHA protections based on length of stay based on the length of
stay of any occupant. As noted above, the FHA refers to any
"building, structure, or portion thereof."2 24 It is likely that courts
would, as the Third Circuit did in Lakeside, look at the longest
stays in even a small portion of the facility in determining
225
whether it qualifies for FHA protections.
Such judicial action may inspire shelters to institute firm
time limits for all occupants. Already, some shelters have policies
that require occupants to leave for a period of time every day,
and it is not unreasonable to think that some shelters may adopt
such policies to avoid more rigorous discrimination laws. It
should be noted that in the small sample of cases to address the
question of whether homeless shelters are dwellings, only Johnson presented a shelter with such a policy and only Johnson
ruled against the inclusion of homeless shelters under the
FHA. 226 This might suggest that the permitted length of stay is
already influencing the outcomes of these cases.
As is the case with each of the factors discussed, in assessing
the desirability of this option the greatest unknown is how shelters and policymakers will respond to the rule. The Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") has placed a high
priority on developing longer-term housing to deal with the nation's homeless, and over the last decade permanent and transitional housing capacity has dramatically increased while emergency housing capacity has declined. 227 If shelters respond to the
more rigorous discrimination regime applied to longer-term
housing by converting to emergency shelters and requiring occupants to vacate their rooms daily, much of the work towards
224 Lakeside, 455 F3d at 159, citing 42 USC § 3602(b).
225 Id at 58-59.

226 Johnson, 786 F Supp at 2 (noting that the shelters were only open from 7 pm to 7
am and accepted people on a first-come, first-served basis).
227 HUD, Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress at 38 (cited in note 37).
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HUD's goal could be undone. Whether this would be a negative
effect will depend on the response of policymakers. If policymakers respond to this situation by increasing the availability of lowincome housing or altering fair housing law, it may be a net benefit to the homeless community. If policymakers fail to respond,
it may mean that more homeless individuals will be left in temporary, emergency shelters with fewer services and little hope of
transitioning to the housing market. It is difficult to predict how
shelter operators and policymakers will respond, making it difficult to argue for any particular approach on a policy basis.
Interestingly, giving greater protections to longer-term facilities runs precisely counter to the prevailing pattern of discrimination seen in shelters today. Shorter-term, emergency shelters
generally have less restrictive admissions policies with regard to
family size or the presence of adolescents, while longer-term,
transitional shelters tend to have more restrictive admissions
policies. 228 This is to be predicted by resource dependence theory.
Transitional shelters provide more extensive services and have
more reason to fear resource stretching from serving a heterogeneous client population.
2. Protections contingent on treating the structure
like a home.
Should the courts emphasize whether the structure is
treated like a home, the desirability of the outcome will likely be
similarly dependent on the response of shelters and policymakers. Evidence of "treat[ing] a building like [a] home" includes
whether occupants "cook their own meals, clean their own rooms
and maintain the premises, do their own laundry, and spend free
time together in common areas." 229 It is unlikely most emergency
shelters would have these elements, and it is likely that transitional shelters would have some of them.
If shelters desired to have a more permissive discriminatory
regime, they may respond by reducing the opportunities for their
occupants to engage in activities that might be considered treating the shelter as a home. To the extent that treating a shelter as
a home has positive influence on homeless individuals, this response could have negative effects unless properly addressed by
policymakers.
228 Weinreb and Rossi, 69 Soc Serv Rev at 96 (cited in note 5).
229 Schwarz v City of TreasureIsland, 544 F3d 1201, 1215 (11th Cir 2008).
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3. Protections contingent on a structure's intended purpose.
Should courts decide to emphasize the intended purpose of
the structure, it is entirely unclear what outcome would be expected. Whether the FHA applied would depend on how courts
characterized the purpose of each shelter. The shelter system in
the United States has many purposes including rehabilitation
and education along with providing varying levels of housing relief.
Drawing from the penal institution example, courts may focus on the primary purpose of the shelter. Should the intended
purpose be characterized as emergency overnight shelter, then
there would be a strong parallel to penal institutions. Just as the
intended purpose of a penal institution is to punish, not to serve
as a residence, 230 the intended purpose of a shelter is as emergency overnight lodgings, not to serve as a residence. Then again,
there is less difference in saying something is intended as emergency lodging, not a residence than in saying something is intended as punishment, not a residence. Courts may simply decide that shelters are intended as residences.
As noted above, there seems to be little risk of the intendedpurpose factor expanding to exclude homeless shelters. However,
it is worth noting that, unlike other cases to consider the "dwelling" question with regard to homeless shelters, the analysis in
Johnson gives priority to the perspective of the housing provider,
not the occupant being housed. The Johnson court found it
"doubtful if 'emergency overnight shelter,' as the District conceives itself to be providing ...can be characterized as a 'dwelling' within the meaning of the Act, even if it may seem like home
to [the homeless plaintiffs]." 231 Johnson again demonstrates how
the emergency-transitional distinction can be created using factors courts have recognized in determining whether a structure
qualifies as a "dwelling." It may be that the outcome of the adoption of this factor would be the same as emphasizing length of
stay or whether the structure was treated like a home. We may
end up with a stratified system of protections that allowed FHA
actions against more home-like, transitional shelters and only
other actions against emergency shelters.

230 Garcia, 114 F Supp 2d at 1161.
231 786 F Supp at 4 (emphasis added).
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Basing Protections on Category of Housing

An approach that may require courts to spend less time considering various factors and shelters to expend less effort enacting policies to avoid regulation would be to treat homeless shelters as a single category of housing either deserving or undeserving of FHA protection.
1. Non-FHA protections only.
The case for giving all homeless shelters only non-FHA protections is weak. There is minimal legal grounding for such a
decision, and the policy implications are uncertain.
Holding that all homeless shelters are undeserving of protection under the FHA runs contrary to the overwhelming weight of
precedent. In all but one case, courts have treated homeless shelters as "dwellings." 232 The main difficulty arises in cases involving longer-term transitional shelters. In these cases, the shelters
typically have very similar characteristics to many other structures that have been found to be "dwellings." Drug- and alcoholtreatment centers, 233 group homes, 234 and halfway houses 235 have
all been found to be "dwellings," despite relatively short stays
and communal living situations.
Furthermore, giving only non-FHA protections to homeless
shelters disagrees with regulations defining residences with respect to disability discrimination, which specifically acknowledge
232

Compare Community House, 490 F3d at 1048 n 2 (finding with "little trouble"

shelter was a "dwelling" because it provided more than just over-night housing and it
charged rent to people staying up to one year); Turning Point, Inc v City of Caldwell, 74
F3d 941, 942 (9th Cir 1996) (assuming without discussion that a shelter was a "dwelling"
under the FHA); Red Bull, 686 F Supp 451 (assuming without comment that the FHA
was applicable to a motel that had a contract to house the homeless); Project BASIC v.
City of Providence, 1990 WL 429846 (D R) (assuming without comment that homeless
shelters are covered under the FHA); Woods, 884 F Supp at 1173 (concluding that a
church-run homeless shelter is a "dwelling" under the FHA); with Johnson, 786 F Supp at
4 (doubting without determining that homeless shelters would be considered "dwellings"
under the FHA).
233 Lakeside, 455 F3d at 160 (holding that a drug and alcohol treatment facility is
considered a "dwelling" under the FHA).
234 Connecticut Hospital v City of New London, 129 F Supp 2d 123, 134-35 (D Conn
2001) (determining that the group home is a "dwelling" under the FHA after considering
several factors including intent to return to the residence, the length of time the person
expects to stay at that location, absence of an alternative place of residence, the nature of
the occupancy, and the relationship between the resident and the property owner).
235 Schwarz v City of Treasure Island, 544 F3d 1201, 1215-16 (lith Cir 2008) (comparing half-way houses to other structures that have been previously held to be "dwellings" under the FHA).
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that there can be residential units within shelters. 236 While these
regulations mean little, at the very least, they specify that there
must be some situation in which the FHA would apply to a homeless shelters, making a categorical exclusion untenable. Courts
have long given judicial deference to the Office of Housing and
237
Urban Development in its interpretations.
Using existing factors courts have used in determining
whether a structure is a "dwelling," the only clear path to finding
a lack of FHA coverage is through the intended-purpose element.
If courts were to characterize the intended purpose of all homeless shelters as emergency lodgings as opposed to residences,
they may hold that all homeless shelters fall outside of the FHA.
If the cost of providing protections against discrimination in
homeless shelters is sufficiently high, there may be a policy argument for this result, however, there is little evidence to support this conclusion at this time.
2. FHA protections only.
There is a much stronger case to be made for giving all
homeless shelters FHA protection. While far from inarguable,
precedent developed from the leading definition of "residence"
likely favors including homeless shelters as dwellings. Courts
have long defined "residence" in this context as "a temporary or
permanent dwelling place, abode or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn or transient visit."238 Courts distinguish between "transients" (those who certainly intend to move on to other residences, such as motel guests) and "inhabitants" (those who reside in a particular place) in determining whether the structure
' 2 39
qualified as a "residence."
The reasoning of Woods within this framework is persuasive.
Even if shelters are designed for short-term housing emergencies, stays are often lengthy. The plaintiffs in Johnson returned
to the same shelter night after night, even though they were
236 24 CFR § 100.201 (2008).
237 See, for example, Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 409 US 205, 210-11
(1972).
238 Hughes Memorial, 396 F Supp at 549 (citing Webster's Third New International
Dictionary).
239 Compare Baxter v City of Belleville, 720 F Supp 720, 731 (S D 1111989) (holding
that residents of an AIDS group home were protected by the FHA); with Patel v Holley
House Motels, 483 F Supp 374, 381 (S D Ala 1979) (holding that a motel was not a dwelling under the FHA).
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turned out every morning and never guaranteed a room. 240 Nationwide, the average length of stay in a shelter for a household
with children is almost six months, while some cities reported an
average length of stay of up to eighteen months. 241 Though the
homeless may hope to go elsewhere like motel guests, "the homeless are not visitors or those on a temporary sojourn in the sense
of motel guests .... [T]hey have nowhere else to go. ' 242 They often intend to return and, as much as is possible for someone in
their circumstances, treat the shelters as homes.
As Woods makes clear, the treatment of homeless shelters as
"dwellings" is not a departure from the Hughes Memorial standard. It is an acceptance of the fact that if a person has no other
structure to call home, then they necessarily treat what shelter
they do have as a residence. To make the FHA applicable to all
homeless shelters only requires the recognition of the lack of an
alternative residence as a dispositive--or perhaps just heavily
243
weighted-factor in the "dwelling" analysis.
The purpose of the FHA likely also argues in favor of blanket
inclusion. The FHA was intended to be an expansive piece of legislation, interpreted broadly to eradicate discrimination in all
forms of housing. Courts have long noted that the FHA "should
be given a generous construction to effectuate its broad and inclusive language." 244 In this spirit, summer homes, 245 halfway
houses, 246 and a group home for AIDS patients 247 have all been
found to be "dwellings." A strong argument can be made that this
expansive purpose of the FHA suggests a reading that includes
homeless shelters regardless of how long occupants stay or how
they treat the shelter. "If the purpose of the FHA is to prevent
discrimination in the housing market so that shelter may be

240 Johnson, 786 F Supp at 2.
241 US Conference of Mayors, Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness at 16 (cited
in note 13).
242 Woods, 884 F Supp at 1173.

243 See, for example, Villegas v Sandy Farms,Inc, 929 F Supp 1324, 1328 (D Or 1996)
(holding that cabins for migrant farm worker qualified as "dwellings" since, like homeless
shelters, the cabins were their only homes). It should be noted, however, that treating
this factor as dispositive might conceivably risk the expansion of FHA protections to cover
other classes of structure the homeless may use, such as park benches.
244 Woods, 884 F Supp at 1173, citing Metropolitan Housing Development Corp v Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F2d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir 1980).
245 United States v Columbus Country Club, 915 F2d 877, 881 (3d Cir 1990).
246 Schwarz v City of TreasureIsland, 544 F3d 1201,1215 (1lth Cir 2008).
247 Baxter, 720 F Supp at 731.
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found ... then this purpose would be served by applying the
FHA to homeless shelters regardless of the length of stay. 248
Perhaps arguing against the inclusion of all homeless shelters under the FHA is the desire to not be duplicative of Title II.
Courts have cited a desire to keep the statutes from being redundant in decisions finding structures to not fall within the
FHA.249 The Eleventh Circuit recently highlighted the public accommodation-dwelling dichotomy noting, "[A]s the administrative definition of 'dwelling unit' suggests, the house, apartment,
condominium, or coop that you live in is a 'residence,' but the
hotel you stay in while vacationing at Disney World is not."250 As
noted above, courts have assumed that Title II prohibits discrimination in homeless shelters, 251 and definitionally, the arguments
for considering homeless shelters to be public accommodations
are likely stronger than those for considering them to be dwellings. The stratified solution would preserve the distinction between public accommodations and dwellings and prevent redundancy.
Also affecting the decision whether to include homeless shelters in the FHA is the standard by which the facially discriminatory policies would be judged. As noted above, the Eighth Circuit
only requires a level of scrutiny mirroring equal protection analysis, 252 while all other circuits to confront the question have allowed only two types of exceptions in the spirit of Johnson Controls. 2 53 The justifications available to shelters for continuing the
policies will set the boundaries for acceptable discrimination. In
assessing the policy impacts of this decision, it will be important
to know what level of scrutiny courts will apply.
If the Eighth Circuit standard is followed, then it is likely
that many of the discriminatory policies that exist today will continue to exist, as it is a simple task to assert a rational basis for
these policies. If the more searching approach is followed, it is
much more likely that these policies will require documented
proof for them to be justified as was the case in Community
248 Joseph W. Singer, Introduction to Property at 585 (Aspen Law and Business 2001)
(presenting this as a possible argument for including homeless shelters under the FHA).
249 Patel, 483 F Supp at 381 (holding that a motel is a public accommodation not a
dwelling under the FHA).
250 Schwarz, 544 F3d at 1214.
251 O'Neal, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 35750 at *20-*21.
252 Familystyle of St. Paul v City of St. Paul, 923 F2d 91, 94 (8th Cir 1991); Oxford
House-Cv City of St. Louis, 77 F3d 249, 252 (8th Cir 1996).
253 Larkin v Michigan Department of Social Services, 89 F3d 285, 290 (6th Cir 1996);
Community House, 490 F3d at 1050; Bangerter,46 F3d at 1503-04.
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House.254 Should the Eighth Circuit approach prevail, shelters
that continued to discriminate would need to expend some time
developing rational bases, and slightly more in the case of sex
discrimination, for their policies. Whether this increased reflection would be sufficient to develop an appropriate level of protections is an empirical question in need of further study. If the
more searching approach prevails, such shelters would need to
document the benefits of their policies to justify them. As before,
whether this would bring the level of discrimination to an optimal level remains unknown. Until we know which approach will be
followed, the effects of including homeless shelters in the FHA
are difficult to assess.
One promising sign that suggests this problem may be responsive to judicially mandated change is that there is already
evidence of a reaction to Community House. In response to the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the King County Office of Civil Rights in
Washington State released a Fair Housing Update for homeless
shelters advising them that "fair housing laws prohibit
sex/gender discrimination." 255 This promises that whichever rule
is chosen, some homeless service providers are likely to take notice.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of including all
homeless shelters within the FHA is that without it, no justification for this open discrimination will ever be judicially required
from these institutions. If occupants of homeless shelters are
protected by the FHA, then they will be allowed to challenge facially discriminatory policies, and courts will be able to strike
down those that are unjustifiable. Without a generous interpretation of the FHA, the means of redress may be severely limited,
and shelters with sex- and family-based discriminatory policies
may never be called upon to justify their policies, which have
been linked to the dissolution of low-income families, the weakening of social support for a population with precious little social support to begin with, the altering of the composition of the
low-income population, and, of course, the humiliation felt by the
victims of discrimination.

254 Community House, 490 F3d at 1052.

255 Christina McLeod, Fair Housing Update: Homeless Service Providers and Fair
Housing Compliance (Wash Dept of Exec Serv 2007), available at <http://www.metrokc.
gov/dias/ocrelhomeless.htm> (last visited May 3, 2009).
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V. CONCLUSION

Facially discriminatory admissions policies in homeless shelters are widespread and tolerated. The impacts of such policies
are not well studied, but a survey of the legal and social science
literature suggests they have the potential to be far reaching.
Individuals may regularly be denied shelter. The composition of
the low-income population may be permanently altered. Families
may be separated to receive shelter. Opportunities for social
support may be cut off. Individuals may suffer humiliation when
denied shelter based on their sex or familial status.
Historically, there has been very little litigation asserting
fair housing rights on behalf of homeless individuals. Difficulties
with procedural barriers and limited potential for relief have limited the usefulness of non-FHA prohibitions on discrimination
for this population. However, despite textual ambiguity, there
are strong arguments in favor of giving FHA protections to at
least a portion of those housed in homeless shelters and perhaps
all. This Comment primarily discussed the strengths and weaknesses of two legal regimes that may be developed in this area:
(1) a stratified regime in which longer-term transitional shelters
receive FHA protections and shorter-term emergency shelters
receive on non-FHA protections and (2) a categorical regime in
which all homeless shelters received FHA protections.
Ultimately which legal regime is preferable depends on how
shelters and policymakers react to the regime. If shelters react to
length-of-stay-dependent rulings by switching from transitional
to emergency shelters, then the goal of HUD to promote transitional housing may be set back. If shelters react to a decision
that all homeless shelters fall under the FHA by draining their
resources in attempting to comply by creating all mixed-use shelters, they may not be able to serve as many individuals and may
ultimately hurt the homeless population. There is also the possibility that some shelters will close in response to such rulings.
The effect such shelter actions would have would depend on the
response of policymakers. Such actions may induce local governments to do more to provide longer term affordable housing
solutions, or they may provoke a less positive response. Until we
know the answers to these empirical questions it is difficult to
know which regime would better benefit the homeless population.
This Comment sought to begin to explore the collateral consequences of shelter admission policies and discuss interpretive
frameworks for allowing that exploration to take place in a judi-
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cial forum. Without such an interpretation, no justification for
this discrimination may ever be judicially required.

